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KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
THE TRIAL OF JESUS
By Charles A. Hawley, of the Seneca Falls (N. Y.) Bar.
I look upon this audience as an array of judges, constituting a
High Court of Appeal. I come before the court, holding a brief,
largely legal in its character, in review of the most memorable trial in
the history of the world.
The trial of Jesus was attended by so many noisy and turbulent
manifestations of the malice of his enemies that superficial readers
regard the proceedings as without legal form; an exercise of the
unrestrained power of a mob; proceeding akin to the execution of
the lynch laws of our western frontiers, and, alas! of late in other
localities claiming at least a higher civilization. This is an erroneous
view. Jesus was first tried before a court professedly acting under
Jewish law; a system exact, definite, and just, and which, properly
administered, furnished a protection to the accused more complete
than any of modern times; a system which to this day gives character
to the jurisprudence of the world.
He was ultimately condemned by a Roman tribunal under a legal
system no less august, and which still forms an important part of the
body of our modern law. And so it has been truly said "that two of
the greatest and most enlightened systems of administrative and
judicial polity that ever existed met and united in compassing the
momentous tragedy of the death of the Son of Man."
It is therefore not inappropriate to review the arrest and trial of
Jesus from a legal standpoint.
The discussion may be likened to an appeal from the judgment of
Pontius Pilate, which sentenced Jesus to be crucified; and is intended
to bring up for review all the preliminary proceedings,--the arrest, the
axamination before Annas and Caiaphas, the night trial before the
Sanhedrim, the trial at daybreak, the hearing before Pilate and before
Herod, as well as the last hearing before Pilate when final judgment
was pronounced.
It is plain that we must put aside for the time all thought of the
divine character of Jesus, and consider him as a mere man, resident in
(This article was first published In December, 1915, Case and Comment.)
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Judea, and like any other man, under the jurisdiction of its courts and
amenable to its laws. The trial must be viewed from a legal stand-
point, and its validity tested not by our notions of its propriety, but by
the laws under which it was professedly conducted. The trial was of
Jesus, the man; not of Christ, the Lord's Anointed.
By the Jewish laws pentinent to the present discussion, it was
provided that unless taken in the actual commission of a crime no
person could be arrested without a formal accusation. The sanhedrim,
the Supreme Court of the Jews, had a place of meeting, which was
not in the palace of the High Priest. Twenty-one members were
required to be present in a capital case. The accused was presumed
to be innocent until proved guilty. No one could be tried or con-
demned unless present. The oath administered to the witness was an
adjuration "By the living God." It was the duty of the priest pre-
siding to call the attention of witnesses to the value of life, and warn
them not to forget anything they knew in the prisoner's favor.
Counsel must be appointed for his defense. Evidence in his favor
was to be freely admitted. No judge who had once spoken for
acquittal could change to a vote for conviction. The votes of the
younger members were taken first that they might not be influenced
by their older associates. Capital cases required a majority of at least
two to convict. A verdict of acquittal could be given at once; that of
guilty could not be pronounced until a day after the conclusion of the
trial. The trial in a capital case must be begun and held only during
the daytime. No judicial procedure could take place on a feast day.
If judgment of acquittal was not reached on the day the trial ended,
the court was obliged to adjourn, for the judges who condemned were
required to fast for a day before they pronounced judgment. In minor
cases counsel could be heard on both sides; in a capital case, only for
the accused. The accused could not be called to testify, nor made a
witness against himself. He could not be convicted on the testimony
of a single witness; at least two must testify in the presence of the
accused, and agree together. Their testimony on this question of
agreement was required to be scrutinized carefully and technically
Every rule that ingenuity could devise and every presumption was in
favor of the accused.
These precise and technical rules illustrate the spirit of the Jewish
law. It was a common saying that "the Sanhedrim was to save, not to
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destroy life." Nor did the safeguards of the law end with conviction
The doomed man was led away to be stoned; but the court remained
in session. An officer stood at the door with a signal flag. Another
followed the prisoner and his attendants to the farthest point from
which he cold see the signal. If any new witness came to prove the
innocence of the convicted man the signal flag was waved; the
attendant at the distant point hastened on, and recalled him for
further hearing.
To these features of the Jewish law many more might be
added, of less pertinency to the present discussion, but all going to
show the humane spirit of their mode of procedure, and how safe
from conviction, if its requirements were observed, any innocent
person would be.
A partial or biased judge could have had no place in such a
system. Everywhere, under all systems, in all ages, a prejudiced or
partisan court has been abhorrent to the idea of justice. The spirit
of the Jewish law would debar a member of the Sanhedrim from
sitting in a case where he was partisan or prejudiced. It demanded an
impartial tribunal.
Vrom this brief survey of the Jewish law and the Jewish court,
let us turn for a hasty and rapid review of the proceedings in the
case before us.
I. The Arrest.
The arrest of Jesus was illegal. He was not at the time actually
engaged in the commission of any real or pretended offense against
the Jewish law. There had been no accusation laid before the court.
No one "had witnessed against him."
More, and worse than this: Jesus had publicly come up from
Galilee; he had entered Jerusalem attended by a great retinue of
followers; he had openly taught in the temple; opportunities for
formal accusation and for apprehending him in the daytime on
regular proceedings were ample. They were not availed of, because
his enemies feared the people. And these enemies were to be his
judges. At the house of the High Priest they conspired to kill him.
This is the shameful record:
"Then assembled together the chief priests, and the scribes, and
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the elders of the people, unto the palace of the high priest, who was
called Caiaphas.
"And consulted that they might take Jesus by subtlety, and- kill
him."
In pursuance of this conspiracy they bribed Judas to betray him
into their hands. Some of them accompanied the officers who
arrested him, without accusation or warrant, and then, instead of
putting him "in ward until the morrow," as the law required in the
case of a night arrest, they took him, bound, with indecent haste, to
an illegal midnight examination.
II. Before Annas and Caiaphas.
The account in St. John alone says, "They led him away to Annas
first." And there he seems to have been examined, struck by an
officious attendant, and then sent bound to Caiaphas. If this be so,
the proceeding has no shadow of legal justification. Annas was not
high priest. He had been deposed by the Romans. Probably the
Jews continued, in their contempt for Roman authority, to regard him
as high priest; but he had no legal power, nor jurisdiction, nor
authority.
It is difficult to clear up the obscurity of the narrative as to
what took place, and whether it was before Annas or Caiaphas, or
both; but whatever it was, if before Annas, it was wholly illegal, for
he was not in office.
If it was before Caiaphas, he had no legal right to sit alone, for
there was no such thing as a sole judge known to the Jewish law.
He had no legal right to question the prisoner, and endeavor to make
him testify against himself. Being one of the conspirators who sought
to take Jesus by subtlety and kill him, he had no mortal right to sit in
judgment upon him.
So that whether Jesus was examined before Annas or Caiaphas,
or both, the examination was irregular and illegal according to Jewish
law.
III. The Night Trial
These unjust, judges, morally disqualified by their partisanship
-and hatred, showed their malevolence by gathering in the night at the
high priest's palace in anticipation of the unauthorized arrest. There,
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in an unusual place,- at an illegal hour, and during the feast of the
Passover, they entered upon his trial. Their partisanship was at least
a moral disqualification, and was so pronounced as, I think, to be a
legal disqualification also, notwithstanding that "a court is usually
the judge of its own prejudices." It would be a reproach upon the
administration of justice anywhere, that judges should sit under such
circumstances; and though it was tolerated in the days of Jeffreys and
held to be legal, I do not think that a judgment of such a court would
be permitted to stand under the humane and ex-act system of the
Jewish law.
However that may be, the trial in the night and during the Pass-
over was against the positive command of the law; every legal safe-
guard of the rights of the prisoner was disregarded or broken down:
the court was organized to convict; no presumption of the innocence
of the accused was permitted. Practically, the conspirators had
-condemned him in his absence, before his arrest. The witnesses were
.not'cautioned as the law required. The court sought witnesses against
the accused ,and not in his favor. No counsel was appointed for his
defense. The vote was not taken in the manner required by the law.
The high priest expressed his opinion first, with a dramatic rending
of his clothes to give emphasis to his illegal verdict. The verdict A as
given at once, when the law required the court to wait for a day, and
spend that day in religious observations and meditation.
But it was thought necessary that some of the forms of law
should be observed, and so witness after witness was fruitlessly called.
The case was growing desperate. At length two false witnesses came.
The fact that they were false would not of itself make the judgment
illegal. False witnesses and lawful judgments upon their testimony
are among the infirmities of human administration. If the judges
knew, they were false,-that is another matter. But we are not told
that they did. They testified to a statement something like one
which we know Jesus made, though he was referring to the temple of
his body, and not to the temple made with hands. They gave a
garbled statement, as false witnesses usually do. It was not a lie out
of whole cloth; but it was nevertheless a lie.
One of the records says that their testimony had the fatal defect
of not agreeing together. But two other records seem to say that the
two said the same thing. How, then, did they not agree? It may be
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that their testimony is not given in full in the records that we have,
and so that the discrepancy does not appear. Or it may be that they
referred to two occasions on which Jesus said the same thing. That
is, that two like but separate offenses were testified to, but the two
witnesses did not agree together and testify as to one and the same
offense.
But this difficulty is not of consequence, for Jesus was not con-
victed upon this testimony.
After it was given, the high priest said fo him, "Answerest thou
nothing? What is it which these witness against thee?" to which
Jesus made no reply. If this was a call upon him to testify against
himself, it was illegal. But if, as I think probable, it was an announce-
ment that the prosecution rested its case, and Jesus could now enter
upon his defense, it was highly improper. He should not have been
called upon to defend himself when the case was not proved. It
should have been promptly dismissed. Jesus knew this and made no
answer.
But then the high priest proceeded, in solemn and formal phrase,
and in direct violation of the law, to adjure and require Jesus to
testify against himself. In response to this illegal inquiry, he put
forth his claim to be the Christ, the Son of God. Thereupon, the
high priest illegally pronounced his opinion, first, "He hath spoken
blasphemy; what need have we of further witnesses?" and called for
the judgment of the court. It was at once pronounced, without the
delay required. Je~us was convicted of blasphemy, a capital offense
against the Jewish law, of which the court had jurisdiction. But
he was convicted, not at all on the testimony of the false witnesses,
but upon his own, illegally extorted from him, convicted without delay,
and in the night. That conviction, thus obtainied, violated many of the
provisions of the Jewish law, and had hardly the semblance of legality.
The Sanhedrim recognized its invalidity, and to cure one of its
patent defects arranged for a morning session. There no witnesses
were produced. Jesus was again illegally called to testify against
himself, and on his own words again illegally convicted of blasphemy.
Every provision of the Jewish law which was violated before was
violated again, except the prohibition against holding court and
rendering judgment in the night. The judgment of the council having
been thus pronounced, he was taken before Pilate.
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IV. Before Pilate.
It must be borne in mind that the Jews were under the dominion
of the Romans. While the Roman emperor permitted the Jewish laws
and their administration, and in minor cases their execution to remain
in the Jewish courts, he took from them the power of life and death.
It is doubtful if they could pronounce sentence of death; certainly no
such sentence could be executed without Roman authority.
Some have thought it difficult to determine the nature of the
proceedings before Pilate,--whether they were judicial, that is, in the
nature of a trial; or quasi judicial or administrative, that is, the
exercise of his discretion in confirming the judgment of the Jewish
council. If the latter, he was guilty of a monstrous wrong; far though
not obliged to enter upon any examination of the merits of the case,
having done so, he was bound to do justice. And yet he condemned a
man whom, after repeated examinations, he repeatedly and to the last
pronounced to be innocent.
But I think it easy to show that the proceeding was much more
than a mere matter of administrative routine; that it had a judicial
character, and was in fact a trial. Many circumstances point to this
conclusion.
The Jews did not ask for permission to execute the sentence of
the council; that would have been followed by death by stoning, and
their continued cry was for crucifixion. Pilate when he went out
to them asked, "What accusation bring ye against this man?" words
appropriate to the opening of a case, and not to its end. Another
account says they began to accuse him, and a third uses the same
words. Pilate, not knowing that they had already done so, told them
to take him and judge him by their law. But they desired an
execution under the Roman law. His sentence was a Roman sentence,
and not a permission to execute the sentence of the Jewish law.
Pursuant to Roman -law his "accusation," written by Pilate, was
displayed upon the cross. That accusation was not of the same
offense for which he was tried in the Jewish court. When they brought
Jesus before Pilate their accusation was not of the blasphemy for
which they had convicted him. They accused him before Pilate of a
political offense,-of treason against the Roman state. Their charge,
pressed again and again, was not blasphemy, but that Jesus claimed
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to be King of the Jews, and the false charge that he forbade giving
tribute to Ceasar. They hypocritically pretended, to be concerned for
the interests of Rome, whose dominion they hated. It was this
charge only to which Pilate gave attention. He called Jesus into his
judgment hall, and asked him, "Art thou the King of the Jews?"
This gharge, so different from that preferred before the council, led
Jesus to inquire, "Sayest thou this thing of thyself, or did others tell
thee of me?" That is, does this come from the Romans or the Jews?
Pilate questioned him at length, and was satisfied of his innocence.
He sent him to Herod, who came to the same conclusion. Pilate
announced his own deliberate judgment of acquittal. This was
judicially pronounced, and could only be reversed on appeal. He
told them that Herod was of the same opinion. Notwithstanding
this, he illegally sought to appease the hatred of the Jewish accusers
by scourging the innocent man. The decision to scourge him was
also a judgment. That judgment was executed, and was a legal bar to
further proceedings. Our maxim that no man shall twice be put in
jeopardy for the same offense comes to us from the Roman law; and
so properly "from thenceforth Pilate sought to release Jesus." He
struggled long against the wily Jews. But at length, appealing to
his love of office, and intimidating him by questioning his fidelity to
the emperor, "If thou let this man go, thou art not Caesar's friend,"
at last they won him to their will. Pilate knew they had delivered
Jesus for envy. He knew they hated Caesar. He knew that if Jesus
had appeared as a claimant for the Jewish crown they would have
welcomed him, and flocked to his revolutionary standard with enthu-
siasm; but he also knew that he held his great office by a feeble
tenure, and so, having wrung fr9m the chief priests who hated Caesar
the strange avowal, "We have no king but Caesar," he delivered Jesus
to be crucified.
Pilate had not even religious enthusiasm or hatred or malice,
urging him on to his awful deed. It was "all hire and salary, not
revenge." Jesus went to the cross, not because the Jewish council had
convicted him of blasphemy, not because he was disloyal to Caesar,
not because of anything charged against him in either court, but
because of the unmanly fears of an ambitious and unscrupulous poli-
tician. Thus it was that "Jesus suffered under Pontius Pilate."
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If the views which have been suggested are correct, the arrest of
Jesus was illegal, his examination before Annas and Caiaphas in the
night, and conducted by questions addressed to him, was unlawful.
The Sanhedrin was a lawful court, and had jurisdiction of the offense
of blasphemy under the Jewish code; but the trial therein violated
many of the provisions of the law. Jesus was convicted at a court
illegally obtained, by judges so hostile that they had no right to sit.
He was brought before the Roman tribunal upon a totally different
charge, and there, having been repeatedly acquitted, after judgment
of scourging had been executed upon him, was thereafter illegally
condemned.
And thus the Jewish council, the Roman tribunal,--under two
great systems of jurisprudence which have long been the admiration of
the world,-were prostituted to bring about a judicial murder.
I have read of a brave soldier to whom for distinguished gallantry
in the field the emperor offered a sword inscribed "To the bravest
grenadier of France." But he declined the sword, saying there are
no bravest among us; we all stand on a common level. Afterward,
leading a forlorn hope, he fell with face to the fo.e Then a unique
and distinguished honor was given him. By an imperial decree his
name continued to be borne upon the roll of his regiment, and every
day at roll call, when his name was called, a sergeant stepped from
the ranks and answered, "Died for France on the field of honor."
So Jesus put aside every earthly honor, trod bravely every path
of human suffering, laid down his life for the salvation of his people.
The shameful scenes we have been discussing were but the gateway
to his triumph; his death was not defeat, but victory. And those who
believe on him, seeing the injustice of his condemnation, seeing that
even Golgotha and the shameful cross were glorified by him, reversing
the judgments of the Jewish and Roman courts, will forever and for-
ever say when they hear his name. He died for us on the field of
honor.
